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Abstract
This paper studies how unionisation regimes that differ in the de-
gree of wage setting centralisation interplay with the strategic choice
of production capacity by firms and how this affects product market
outcomes. When labour markets are unionised, firms typically opt for
under-capacity in order to dampen the unions’ wage claims. This is
in contrast with the conventional choice of over-capacity that applies
when labour markets are competitive. Moreover, unless unions are
distinctly oriented towards employment, the level of capacity is more
efficient under centralised unionisation than in a decentralised struc-
ture. Relative to more general welfare outcomes, profits are always
higher under decentralised unionisation, but both consumer surplus
and overall welfare can be higher under a centralised structure, de-
pending on the unions’ preference towards wages or employment.
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1 Introduction
For some years, the debate on the economic effects of alternative unions’
regimes is high on the political agenda in many countries (e.g. OECD, 2004).
At the industry level, a decentralised wage setting structure, involving firm-
specific unions, is commonly contrasted with a completely centralised one, in
which a single industry union sets a standard wage for the entire industry. At
the country level, centralised unions representing all workers in an industry
are widespread in continental Europe while firm-specific unions and decen-
tralised wage setting are largely predominant in UK, North America and
Japan (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Freeman, 1988; Layard and Nickell,
1999; Flanagan, 1999). However, it has been documented that decentralised
unions are gaining popularity in countries such as Sweden, Germany and
Italy, which are recently moving towards a more decentralised unionisation
structure (Katz, 1993; Del Boca et al., 1999; Haucap et al., 2007). Indeed,
the greater rigidities associated with centralised wage setting have currently
come under attack in the policy debate, so that any move towards a more
decentralised structure is commonly considered as good for overall economic
prosperity.
Starting from the seminal works by Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Davidson
(1988) and Dowrick (1989), the prominent role played by unions on industrial
organization outcomes has been recently recognised by the growing literature
on unionised oligopolies.1 In such a framework, recent theoretical contri-
butions have studied in detail the performance of alternative unionisation
institutions in relation to both firms’ profitability and overall welfare. For
instance, the role of alternative unionisation structures is considered in affect-
ing innovation and R&D incentives (Haucap and Wey, 2004; Manasakis and
Petrakis, 2009; Mukherjee and Pennings, 2011), incentives for foreign direct
investment (Mukherjee and Zhao, 2007; Mukherjee and Suetrong, 2012), as
well as the welfare effects of downstream mergers (Brekke, 2004; Symeonidis,
2010) and managerial delegation (Fanti and Meccheri, 2013, 2015; Meccheri
1Among others, see also Naylor, 1999; Correa-Lo´pez and Naylor, 2004; Lommerud et
al., 2005; Correa-Lo´pez, 2007.
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and Fanti, 2014).
Up to now, however, the literature on unionised oligopolies has devoted no
attention to the effects of unionisation when firms can strategically manipu-
late production capacity. Such a latter issue has been extensively treated as a
sequential game of “capacity-then-quantity” (e.g. Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980;
Brander and Spencer, 1983), showing that firms generally maintain over-
capacity in order to lead their rivals to reduce output.2 Analysing if this still
applies when firms’ production costs are set by unions and, particularly, how
alternative unionisation structures differently affect market outcomes in such
a framework is obviously relevant to the concerns of labour economics and
industrial organization, as well as to provide new insights to the debate on
the desirability of alternative unionisation regimes.
In this paper, we aim at extending the literature on unionised oligopoly
– so far focused on firms’ competition in the product market – to the case
in which firms strategically compete also on capacities, and investigating the
role of alternative unionisation structures in such a context. This will permit
also to assess if the conventional result by the literature of dynamic (strate-
gic) capacity choice, namely investing in over-capacity represents a strategic
incentive for firms despite its cost-inefficiency, is robust to unionisation.3
We analyse a three-stage duopoly game: at the first stage, each firm
chooses its production capacity; at the second stage, unions (that can be
decentralised or centralised) set wages; at the third stage, each firm decides
its optimal (profit-maximising) output. Our main results can be summarised
2Extensions to a situation in which profit-maximising firms compete with labour-
managed firms (Stewart, 1991; Zhang, 1993; Haruna, 1996), to mixed oligopolies (Wen
and Sasaki, 2001; Nishimori and Ogawa, 2004; Lu and Poddar, 2005, 2006, 2009; Ogawa,
2006; Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n, 2007, 2010; Ferna´ndez-Ruiz, 2012), or in the presence of
managerial delegation (Tomaru et al., 2009), lead to more various results depending on
the modelling environment.
3Further than inducing incumbent rivals to reduce output, another important reason
for holding idle capacity, also highlighted by the above-mentioned literature, is to deter
market entry (see, also, Bulow et al., 1985; Basu and Singh, 1990; Horiba and Tsutsui,
2000). We will not consider market entry in this paper, deferring to future research the
study of such an issue in our framework.
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as follows. Firstly, introducing unionisation in a duopoly model with capac-
ity choice leads to an important effect (a wage effect) that acts against the
standard strategic capacity-choice effect, or capacity competition effect, high-
lighted by the received literature. This “wage effect” relates to the fact that
firms have an incentive to reduce capacity in order to dampen the unions’
wage claims. Moreover, unless unions are extremely oriented towards employ-
ment, the “wage effect” outweighs the “capacity competition effect”, hence
the standard result is reversed: firms choose under -capacity and this applies
irrespective of the unionisation regime.4
Secondly, the “wage effect” is stronger when unionisation is decentralised
with respect to the case in which there is a single industry-wide union. More
exactly, in the presence of firm-specific unions, wages prove to be more re-
sponsive to changes in production capacity, implying that firms have greater
incentives to reduce it; as a consequence, under-capacity is more severe un-
der such unionisation regime. In other words, the “stickier” wage under cen-
tralised unionisation (generally) leads to a more efficient outcome in terms
of capacity choice by firms.
Finally, in relation to the comparison between alternative unionisation
structures in terms of welfare outcomes, we show that, while profits are
(as intuitive) always higher under decentralised unionisation, both consumer
surplus and overall welfare can be (rather counter-intuitively) higher under
a centralised structure. In particular, this actually applies, for consumer
surplus, when unions are strongly oriented towards employment, and, for
social welfare, unless unions are extremely oriented towards employment or
sufficiently oriented towards wages. These represent novel results since, due
4This is a reminiscent of the well-known under-investment or hold-up result in the
presence of unionisation (e.g. Grout, 1984, and Manning, 1987, for capital investments;
Haucap and Wey, 2004, and Lommerud and Straume, 2012, for investments in technology
and innovation). However, the issue we study is different from the hold-up problem for
various reasons. Most notably, as it will be pointed out, the particular cost structure that
relates here to the capacity investment, makes it different from a standard cost-reducing
(or productivity-enhancing) investment. Moreover, while the hold-up literature does not
deal with the interplay between the capacity competition effect and the wage effect, this
is crucial in determining the equilibrium (under-)capacity result in our framework.
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to the fact that a central union fixes a higher wage, output (consumer surplus)
and welfare as a whole are generally larger in a decentralised structure.5 We
point out how our unconventional results strongly relate to the interplay
between the unions’ role in setting wages and the strategic capacity choice
by firms.
Our analysis and results may also shed new light on the relationship
among unions, wages and firm size, considering firms’ production capacity as
a proxy for the latter. Indeed, there exists a sizable empirical literature doc-
umenting that unionised and non-unionsed firms may differ along a number
of dimensions (e.g. geography, firm size, industry), which may independently
influence wage levels (e.g. DiNardo and Lee, 2004). In this work we high-
light a theoretical reason, which has not been considered before, affecting the
link between firm size and wages according to the structure of unionisation.
Indeed, firms can strategically have an incentive to choose its plant size (or
capacity) in order to affect their workers’ wages, and we point out how this
incentive can differ substantially in relation to the unionisation regime.
The remaining part of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce the basic model and present results of the benchmark case
without unions. Section 3 introduces unions into the analysis; we derive the
equilibrium outcomes with both decentralised (firm-specific) and centralised
(industry-wide) union(s), discussing the main results concerning capacity
choice. In Section 4, we analyse and compare alternative unionisation regimes
in terms of welfare outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
5For instance, Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2003) shows that “the consumer surplus is greater when
negotiations are decentralized since the stronger the bargaining position of the workers is,
the greater the wage paid by firms is, the lower the output level of industry and, thus, the
consumer surplus” (Ba´rcena-Ruiz, 2003, p. 350). Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Davidson
(1988) first showed that centralised unionisation results in higher wages, hence workers
(unions) prefer centralisation, while firms prefer a decentralised unionisation structure.
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2 Model
We consider a duopolistic Cournot market for a single homogeneous product,
with inverse demand given by:
p = 1−Q (1)
where p denotes price and Q is the sum of firms’ output (Q = qi + qj , with
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j).6 Firms produce according to an identical cost function and,
following an established literature, we assume that, in relation the generic
firm i, it takes the following form:
Ci = wili + (xi − qi)2 (2)
where wi is the per-worker wage (with wi < 1), li is the employment level
of the firm i and xi is its production capacity, hence (xi − qi) represents the
(positive or negative) “excess capacity”, which also implies that the long-
run average cost is minimised when quantity equals production capacity,
hence both over-capacity and under-capacity are “inefficient”. In particular,
this (quadratic) form of the cost function has been widely adopted by the
previous literature that analyses capacity choice (e.g. Horiba and Tsutsui,
2000; Nishimori and Ogawa, 2004; Lu and Poddar, 2005; Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Garzo´n, 2010). One the one hand, it aims at capturing a situation, origi-
nally investigated by Vives (1986), in which firms can produce and sell more
than capacity (considered as the efficient scale of operation) at an increasing
marginal cost (see also Spencer and Brander, 1992). On the other hand, it
also considers the presence of idle capacity costs (such as depreciation, main-
tainance, rent, cost arising due to defective materials, other opportunity-costs
and costs remain unobsorbed or uncovered due to under-utilisation of plant
capacity), which is largely recognised by the cost accounting literature (e.g.
Lal, 2002, ch. 7).7
6Notice that the more general inverse demand p′ = a− bQ′ can be obtained from this
normalised model simply by fixing p = p′/a and Q = (b/a)Q′.
7Notice that due to its quadratic form, the cost function here adopted implies that
the cost of having over- or under-capacity is symmetric, while in the seminal work by
6
Accordingly, the firm i’s profits are defined as follows:
pii = (1−Q)qi − wili − (xi − qi)2 (3)
and we assume a one-to-one relationship between employment and output,
qi = li. Moreover, following the unionised oligopolies literature, we consider
a situation in which wages are monopolistically chosen by union(s).8 Specifi-
cally, we consider the following three-stage game: in the first stage, each firm
chooses its production capacity; in the second stage, unions choose wages; in
the third stage, each firm chooses its output level. Figure 1 summarises the
timing of events.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms decide capacity 
(choose x) 
Wages w are set 
by union(s) 
Firms choose 
output 
(employment) q 
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
Figure 1: Timing
Particularly, in relation to the second stage, we analyse two alternative
scenarios: i) unionisation is decentralised, hence two firm-specific unions
choose wages for their own employees (firms); ii) unionisation is centralised,
hence an industry-wide union chooses an uniform wage for all employees
(firms) in the industry. This will permit us to compare the performances of
those alternative unionisation regimes.
As usual, to look for a subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the game
backwards. At the third stage (the market game), firms choose output to
Vives (1986) production beyond planned capacity is considered to be extra costly than
production within the capacity-limit chosen before. We defer to the concluding section for
a preliminary discussion on this point, while in the Appendix (provided as Supplementary
material) we analyse a case with a generalised version of Eq. (2).
8The monopoly union model is widely adopted in the unionised oligopolies literature
(e.g. Brekke, 2004; Haucap and Wey, 2004; Lommerud et al., 2005).
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maximise (3). In relation to the generic firm i, the first-order condition for
profit maximisation leads to the firm’s reaction function as:
qi(qj) =
1− wi − qj + 2xi
4
(4)
and from (4), by substituting for the corresponding expression for the firm
j, we get the equilibrium output by firm i, for given wages and production
capacities:
qi(w,x) =
3− 4wi + wj + 8xi − 2xj
15
(5)
with w = (w1, w2) and x = (x1, x2).
2.1 A benchmark case: capacity choice without union-
isation
For following comparisons and discussion, it can be useful to recall equi-
librium outcomes without unionisation. In this benchmark case, only two
stages apply: in the first stage, each firm chooses its production capacity; in
the second stage, each firm chooses its output level, given firms’ production
capacities.
Without loss of generality, let normalise to zero the exogenous wage for
(non-unionised) workers, i.e. wi = wj = 0. By substituting (5) and the
corresponding for firm j in (3), and maximising with respect to xi drives to
the following reaction function in capacity space:
xi(xj) =
48− 32xj
97
(6)
which, in turn, leads to the following (symmetric) equilibrium choice of ca-
pacity and output:
x =
16
43
; q =
15
43
. (7)
Remark 1 When wages are exogenously given, firms always choose over-
capacity.9
9As expected (and shown below), equilibrium wages in the presence of unions are
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3 Capacity choice under unionisation
3.1 Decentralised unionisation
In the presence of labour (monopoly) unions, the latter set wages at the
second stage of the game (see Figure 1). Specifically, when unionisation is
decentralised, firm-specific (symmetric) unions simultaneously fix wages for
their own workers. We consider that unions have weighted preferences over
wage and employment (e.g. Pencavel, 1984, 1985; Dowrick and Spencer,
1994) and, in particular, the utility of the firm i’s union is given by the
following utility function:
Vi = w
θ
i l
1−θ
i (8)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is the relative weight placed by unions on wages with re-
spect to employment. In particular, for θ > (<) 0.5 unions have preferences
relatively more wage-oriented (employment-oriented), while θ = 0.5 refers to
the special case of total wage bill-maximising unions.10
Unions maximise their objective functions with respect to wages, taking
firms’ output decision into account. Substituting (5) in (8) and maximising
with respect to wi, we get:
wi(wj) =
θ(3 + wj + 8xi − 2xj)
4
(9)
which defines the sub-game perfect best-reply function in wages of the union-
firm pair i, under the assumption of a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equi-
librium in the product market. Solving the system composed by (9) and its
greater than zero (i.e. the exogenous or non-unionised wage of this section), then profits
are lower under unionisation (irrespective of the regime). Moreover, since higher wages
lead to lower output, also consumer surplus and overall welfare are lower when labour
market is unionised. In Section 3, we will compare relative profits, consumer surplus and
social welfare under alternative (decentralised or centralised) unionisation regimes.
10A more general Stone-Geary expression for the unions’ utility function would be Vi =
(wi − w)θl1−θi , which also includes the workers’ reservation wage w. Since our results
would not change qualitatively, in order to streamline the exposition somewhat, we omit
w (that can be thought as normalised to zero, such as the exogenous wage of Section 2.1).
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counterpart for j, we get the sub-game perfect equilibrium wage, for given
capacity choices xi and xj :
wi(x) =
θ2(3− 2xi + 8xj) + θ(12 + 32xi − 8xj)
16− θ2 (10)
and, by substituting (10) in (5) and (3), we get output and profit as a func-
tion of the capacity choices. At the first stage, firms simultaneously choose
capacity to maximise their own profits, which leads to the following reaction
function for the firm i:
xi(xj) =
64 [192− 348θ + 117θ2 + 42θ3 − 3θ4 − (128− 392θ + 408θ2 − 152θ3 + 8θ4)xj ]
24832 + 69632θ − 48288θ2 + 4352θ3 + 97θ4 .
(11)
The reaction function in production capacity, as described by (11), is
downward-sloping (i.e. firms’ capacities are strategic substitutes) for the usual
reason highlighted by the received literature: by increasing production ca-
pacity, a firm induces its rival to reduce output and, since excess capacity is
costly, also production capacity. Furthermore, the above reaction function
highlights the role played by unions. Particularly, according to (11), when
the unions’ aggressiveness on wages, captured by θ, increases, the firm’s i
reaction function undergoes a non-parallel and downward shift. Thus, for
a given level of the rival’s production capacity, the firm i reduces its own
capacity in order to dampen its union’s (stronger) wage claims.11
In symmetric equilibrium, we get:
xDU =
64(16− 33θ + 18θ2 − θ3)
2752 + 3024θ − 2604θ2 + 203θ3 (12)
qDU =
60(16− 16θ − θ2 + θ3)
2752 + 3024θ − 2604θ2 + 203θ3 (13)
where the superscript DU recalls that they are obtained under decentralised
unionisation.
11This effect will be discussed below in greater detail.
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Now, by exploiting (12) and (13), we determine the choice of the (positive
or negative) excess capacity which, interestingly, depends on the union’s
preference parameter.
Result 1 Under decentralised unionisation, firms choose under-capacity un-
less unions are extremely oriented towards employment. When θ is extremely
low, they choose instead over-capacity.
Proof. By using (12) and (13), we get that, for θ ∈ (0, 1):
xDU − qDU =
4(16− 288θ + 303θ2 − 31θ3)
2752 + 3024θ − 2604θ2 + 203θ3 R 0⇔ θ ⋚
136− 60√5
31
= 0.0592. (14)
By defining as “capacity inefficiency” the absolute value of the excess
capacity, by numerical comparison between equilibrium excess capacity in
the benchmark (without unions) case and (14), we also get:12
{
|x− q| > |xDU − qDU | if θ < 0.1384 and θ > 0.8997
|x− q| < |xDU − qDU | otherwise (15)
hence, the following result can be stated in relation to the comparison be-
tween capacity-efficiency under decentralised unionisation and the case with-
out unions.
Result 2 When unions are distinctly oriented towards wages or towards em-
ployment, firms are more “capacity-efficient” under decentralised unionisa-
tion than in the case without unionisation.
Figure 2 provides a graphical proof of Result 2 (as well as of Result 1). In
particular, it displays the behaviour of (xDU − qDU) (red line) and compares
it with that of (x − q) (black line). Notice that, in order to provide a clear-
cut comparison of capacity-efficiency under the two alternative regimes, the
12All the numerical results and the graphical proofs that follow are derived in MAPLE
(programs available from the authors upon request).
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excess capacity for the case without unionisation, which is always positive,
is “mirrored” also with negative sign (dotted-dashed curve). Clearly, for a
given θ value, capacity inefficiency is larger when the curve is farther from
the x-axis.
Figure 2: Excess capacity: decentralised unionisation vs. non-unionisation
In line with Result 2, Figure 2 shows that, for intermediate values of θ, the
non-unionisation regime is more capacity-efficient than decentralised union-
isation, while the reverse holds true for extreme values of θ. In particular,
when unions only care about employment (i.e. θ → 0), wages are de facto
exogenous,13 so they do not depend on production capacity by firms and equi-
librium outcomes (including capacity choice) parallel those of the benchmark
case without unions. However, when unions also care about wages, from (10),
we get a positive relationship between wages and production capacity:
∂wi(x)
∂xi
=
2θ(16− θ)
16− θ2 > 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1). (16)
13They correspond to the workers’ reservation wage which is normalised to zero in this
model.
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In order to provide a general intuition on the effect of higher capacity
on wages, from Eq. (8), we can note that the first-order condition for the
optimal wage set by union i leads to:14
ηi =
θ
1− θ (17)
where ηi ≡ − ∂li∂wi · wili is the wage elasticity of the firm i’s labour demand.
Higher capacity chosen by firm i will lead to higher output and therefore
higher employment. This reduces labour demand elasticity and, as a conse-
quence, leads the union i to increase wages. Moreover, this effect is increasing
in θ. Indeed, a more wage-oriented union will set the wage on a part of the
labour demand curve, where wi is higher relative to li and the reduction
of labour demand elasticity due to and increase of employment is more siz-
able. Thus, the higher the union orientation towards wages, the larger the
reduction in labour demand elasticity due to a marginal increase in employ-
ment, leading to a larger wage increase. This “wage effect” also implies that
firms have an incentive to reduce production capacity in order to dampen
the unions’ wage claims and this incentive is stronger, the higher θ. Hence,
production capacity decreases when θ increases and, as a consequence, also
excess capacity reduces, becoming even negative when unions are sufficiently
oriented towards wages.15
The mechanism above described has two implications that are worth re-
marking. Firstly, while in the non-unionised case there is always capacity-
inefficiency, under decentralised unions a recover of efficiency in capacity
choice does exist for a given value of the unions’ preferences parameter (that
is, for θ = 0.0592). Secondly, even if, for the reason above explained, the
“wage effect” (i.e. ∂w/∂x) is monotonically increasing in θ, under-capacity
is particularly severe for intermediate values of θ. This is due to the fact
that θ does not only affect the choice of x, but also that of q. This makes
14We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for having suggested such inter-
pretation.
15Notice that this applies even if unionisation leads to a higher wage and lower output,
implying that the reduction in production capacity chosen by firms is generally larger than
the decrease in output.
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the difference (x− q) non-monotonic with respect to θ, implying that, when
θ is neither sufficiently high nor sufficiently low, capacity-efficiency is higher
in the benchmark (without unions) case.16
3.2 Centralised unionisation
Now we consider the case of centralised unionisation. A monopoly industry-
wide union chooses a single wage for all workers in the industry (wi = wj = w)
to maximise:
V = wθ(li + lj)
1−θ. (18)
By substituting (5) and the corresponding equation of firm j (with wi =
wj = w) in (18) and maximising with respect to w, we get:
w(x) = θ(1 + xi + xj). (19)
Again, by substituting (19) in (5) and (3), we get output and profit as
a function of the capacity choices. Firms simultaneously choose capacity at
the first stage to maximise their own profits, which leads to the following
reaction function for the firm i:17
xi(xj) =
2 [24− 33θ + 9θ2 − (16 + 18θ − 9θ2)xj ]
97 + 96θ − 18θ2 (20)
and, in symmetric equilibrium, we get:
xCU =
2(8− 11θ + 3θ2)
43 + 44θ − 12θ2 (21)
16Also notice that when θ → 1 (unions only care about wages), excess capacity is
null. However, such a result is not so relevant and can be related to the well-known
“Cheshire Cat” union problem, in which setting extremely high wages would lead unions
into extinction due to the fact that firms’ output and employment collapse to zero (e.g.
Burda, 1990). Obviously, when firms do not produce, also production capacity will be
(optimally) set to zero, explaining why excess capacity disappears.
17It displays the same characteristics described and discussed above for the case with
decentralised unions (see Eq. (11)). In particular, it is downward-sloping and shifts
downward following an increase in θ.
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qCU =
15(1− θ)
43 + 44θ − 12θ2 (22)
where the superscript CU recalls that they are obtained with a central union.
Result 3 Under centralised unionisation, firms choose under-capacity unless
union is sufficiently oriented towards employment. When θ is sufficiently low,
they choose instead over-capacity.
Proof. By using (21) and (22), we get that, for θ ∈ (0, 1):
xCU − qCU =
1− 7θ + 6θ2
43 + 44θ − 12θ2 R 0⇔ θ ⋚
1
6
= 0.1667. (23)
Result 4 Firms are always more “capacity-efficient” under centralised union-
isation than in the case without unionisation. That is, the following always
applies:
|xCU − qCU | < |x− q| for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 3: Excess capacity: centralised,
decentralised and non-unionisation
Figure 4: Excess capacity (absolute val-
ues): decentralised vs. centralised union-
isation
15
Figure 3 provides a graphical proof of Result 4. Furthermore, it also
compares the behaviour of the excess capacity under centralised unionisation
(blue line) and decentralised unionisation (red dashed line), showing that,
unless unions are very strongly oriented towards employment, a centralised
structure leads to a more efficient outcome (this appears even more clearly in
Figure 4, in which excess capacity behaviour under alternative unionisation
structure is plotted in absolute value).
In particular, by numerical comparison between (14) and (23), we get:
|xDU − qDU | > |xCU − qCU | if θ > 0.0876 (24)
and the following result can be stated.
Result 5 Generally, firms are more “capacity-efficient” under centralised
unionisation than under decentralised unionisation. Indeed, the reverse only
applies when unions are very strongly oriented towards employment.
In order to understand the economic intuition behind the above results,
by deriving the sub-game equilibrium wage under centralised unionisation
(Eq. (19)) with respect to the production capacity chosen by a given firm,
we obtain:
∂w(x)
∂xi
= θ > 0 for any θ ∈ (0, 1) (25)
which implies that the “wage effect”, described and discussed for the decen-
tralised unionisation case, also applies to a situation in which unionisation
is centralised. This explains why, also in such a unionisation regime, firms
generally opt for under-capacity.
However, if we compare Eq. (25) against Eq. (16), we can also deduce
that the “wage effect” is always stronger when unionisation is decentralised.18
The intuition behind such result can be provided, as already done in Section
3.1, by noting that, from the first-order condition for the optimal wage set
by the central union, we get:
18This simply derives by noting in (16) that 2(16− θ)/(16− θ2) > 1 for any θ ∈ (0, 1).
16
−∂(li + lj)
∂w
· w
li + lj
=
θ
1− θ . (26)
In this case, when firm i increases xi, the positive effect on overall em-
ployment is made less sizable by the fact that firm j reacts by reducing its
production capacity (see Eq. (20)), hence its output and employment. Since
the central union is concerned with employment as a whole, this implies
that, for any given value of labour demand elasticity (or θ), the wage in-
crease following that in xi is lower than in the decentralised regime, where
(firm-specific) unions are only concerned with their own employment.
In other words, under centralised unionisation, the wage is always less
responsive to the level of capacity (i.e. it is “stickier”) than that fixed by
firm-specific unions, hence firms have less incentives to reduce capacity in
order to dampen the industry-wide union’s wage claims. As a consequence,
production capacity is higher, hence under-capacity is lower, than in a de-
centralised structure.
4 Welfare results under alternative unionisa-
tion structures: a comparison
In this section, starting from the equilibrium outcomes above obtained, we
perform a welfare analysis. This will also permit to assess whether the con-
ventional wisdom that decentralised unions should be welfare-preferred still
applies to a duopolistic setting with (strategic) capacity choice.
In particular, by using (3), (10), (12), (13) and (19), (21), (22), we get
that equilibrium wage and profit under alternative unionisation regimes are
given by, respectively:
wDU =
225θ(16− θ2)
2752 + 3024θ − 2604θ2 + 203θ3 (27)
piDU =
32(24832 + 19968θ − 162720θ2 + 170560θ3 − 56895θ4 + 4158θ5 + 97θ6)
(2752 + 3024θ − 2604θ2 + 203θ3)2
(28)
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and
wCU =
75θ
43 + 44θ − 12θ2 (29)
piCU =
2(97− 98θ − 113θ2 + 132θ3 − 18θ4)
(43 + 44θ − 12θ2)2 . (30)
Furthermore, by considering that consumer surplus is CS = 2q2 and
overall welfare is SW = 2pi + 2wl + CS, we get that:19
SWDU =
8(429056 + 562944θ − 1964160θ2 + 1314080θ3 − 375060θ4 + 34839θ5 − 1699θ6)
(2752 + 3024θ − 2604θ2 + 203θ3)2
(31)
SWCU =
2(419 + 479θ − 1126θ2 + 264θ3 − 36θ4)
(43 + 44θ − 12θ2)2 . (32)
Result 6 (welfare comparisons) By comparing equilibrium outcomes un-
der alternative unionisation structures, the following results apply:
• firms’ profits are always higher under decentralised unionisation than
under centralised unionisation;
• unless unions are strongly oriented towards wages, total wage bill is
higher under centralised unionisation than under decentralised unioni-
sation. Instead, the reverse holds when θ > 0.7090;
• unless unions are strongly oriented towards employment, consumer sur-
plus is higher under decentralised unionisation than under centralised
unionisation. In particular, the reverse holds when θ < 0.1287;
19Notice that we use the total wage bill instead of union utility in the welfare function.
In this choice we follow many others in the literature (e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1988;
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Zhao, 2001) and this can be explained by the fact that
unions’ members are also final good consumers. Alternatively, since in our case the wage
bill also corresponds to the union’s rent (reservation wage is normalised to zero), the latter
can be considered as a part of the producer surplus (Bughin and Vannini, 1995).
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• social welfare as a whole is higher under centralised unionisation un-
less unions are extremely oriented towards employment or sufficiently
oriented towards wages, that is for 0.037 < θ < 0.2873. Otherwise, it
is higher under decentralised unionisation.
Figure 5: Decentralised vs. centralised unionisation: welfare comparisons
Figure 5 provides a graphical proof of Result 6, the economic intuition
of which can be explained as follows. Firstly, notice that, although cost-
inefficiency linked to excess capacity is generally higher with firm-specific
unions, the standard result that profits are larger under decentralised union-
isation is always confirmed. This means that larger excess-capacity costs
under decentralised unionisation are more than offset by the higher wages
fixed by a central union. However, for reasons that have already been dis-
cussed, the profit differential in favour of firm-specific unions tends to reduce
rapidly as θ increases.
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On the other side, unless unions are too much wage-aggressive, the total
wage bill is higher with a central union. Moreover, if unions are strongly
employment-oriented, also the consumer surplus is higher under centralised
unionisation. The latter is a novel result since, due to the fact that a central
union sets a higher wage than firm-specific unions, resulting output (hence,
consumer surplus) is generally lower in the former unionisation structure.20
The unconventional result related to the consumer surplus strongly re-
lates here to the interplay between wage determination by unions and ca-
pacity choice by firms. In fact, there are two conflicting effects that affect
output and consumer surplus under alternative regimes. On the one hand,
since under centralised unionisation firms choose higher capacity, they also
increase output to reduce cost-inefficiency associated with excess capacity.21
On the other hand, the wage fixed by an industry wide-union is higher than
that set by firm-specific unions, and this drives to a lower level of output
under centralisation. However, when unions are distinctly oriented towards
employment, there is not too much difference between wages under alterna-
tive unionisation regimes. Hence, when θ is low, the former effect linked to
the capacity choice prevails and output (hence, consumer surplus) is higher
under centralisation. Moreover, there exists a range, for which unions are
properly employment-oriented, where consumer surplus and total wage bill
differentials (in favour of centralised unionisation) together prevail on profit
differential (in favour of decentralised unionisation) and, as a consequence,
also social welfare as a whole becomes higher in a centralised structure.
20In Fanti and Meccheri (2013), it is established an “irrelevance result” in the presence of
managerial delegation (i.e. firms’ owners delegate output decisions to managers), according
to which consumer surplus (and overall welfare) does not depend on the unions’ structure.
However, the (strict) preference by consumers and society for a centralised wage setting
structure has not yet been affirmed in the unionised oligopoly literature.
21Recall that when θ is very low, excess capacity is positive also under unionisation.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how unionisation regimes that differ in the
degree of wage setting centralisation interplay with the strategic choice of pro-
duction capacity by firms, and how this affects product market and welfare
outcomes. Our findings have shown that under unionisation firms generally
opt for under-capacity, in sharp contrast with the traditional choice of over-
capacity. This is because, in the presence of unionisation, the “distortions” in
the labour market (the “wage effect”) and the product market (the standard
“capacity competition effect”) operate one against another, and (generally)
the former prevails upon the latter. Furthermore, due to the fact that wages
are less responsive to the production capacity by firms, capacity-efficiency
is generally (i.e. unless unions are strongly oriented towards employment)
higher under centralised unionisation than in a decentralised structure.
Relative to more general welfare outcomes, we have pointed out that,
while profits are always higher under decentralised unionisation, both con-
sumer surplus and overall welfare can be higher under a centralised structure.
In particular, this actually applies, for consumer surplus, when unions are
strongly employment-oriented, and, for social welfare, unless unions are ex-
tremely oriented towards employment or sufficiently oriented towards wages.22
These represent novel results since, due to the fact that a central union
fixes a higher wage, the conventional belief would be that output (consumer
surplus) and welfare as a whole are generally larger in a decentralised struc-
ture. Instead, our (unconventional) results, that strongly relate to the inter-
action between the unions’ role in setting wages and the strategic capacity
choice by firms, shed new light on the issue of which unionisation structure
is more desirable from a welfare viewpoint, providing a reason against the
22In the working paper version (Fanti and Meccheri, 2014), we also assess the robust-
ness of such results by also considering product differentiation and price competition
(such extensions are shown in the Appendix, provided as Supplementary material). Our
findings prove to be qualitatively robust to such extensions. In particular, introducing
product differentiation and price competition enlarges the range of situations, in which
centralised unionisation outperforms a decentralised structure in terms of both capacity
choice-efficiency and welfare outcomes.
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dominant wisdom that a decentralised structure is generally preferable.
Future research directed to further extend our model can be carried out
along possible different lines. For instance, in order to maintain the analysis
as simple as possible, we have considered a cost function according to which
producing below capacity is equally costly as producing above capacity. We
have mentioned various reasons for which holding idle capacity is itself costly,
but a more realistic scenario should provide that producing above capacity
is more costly. Hence, it is worth investigating how our main results are
affected by introducing such an asymmetry in under/over capacity costs. In
this regard, while we have to leave the final answers to further research, a pre-
liminary intuition could arise by noting that the case analysed in this paper
(with symmetric costs) can be considered as a special case contrasting the
other limiting case, studied by the received literature on strategic capacity
choice, in which producing above capacity entails infinite extra-costs (that is,
it is not possible to produce over and above the installed production capac-
ity). Taking into account that our framework generally leads to an under-
capacity (equilibrium) result against the standard over-capacity result by the
standard literature, this seems to suggest that introducing cost-asymmetry
would weaken our results but, at the same time, they would continue to ap-
ply qualitatively providing that costs of producing above capacity are not
excessively higher than those of producing below capacity.
Moreover, we have studied a framework where unions set wages after than
firms have chosen capacity. This can be rationalised by the fact that, at least
in the short-medium run, production capacity is generally an irreversible
choice (i.e. modifying production capacity entails very large costs for firms),
while revising workers’ wages can be done more frequently. Nevertheless,
considering also an alternative scenario, where the timing of moves relative to
capacity choice and wage setting is reversed, deserves a future investigation.
Finally, further extensions of this model could be performed by considering
an oligopoly framework with more than two firms, which could also permit
to analyse a scenario where decentralised wage setting applies to some firms
and centralised wage setting to other firms, or by introducing market entry
and union(s)-firms bargaining in determining wages into the analysis.
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